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I. BACKGROUND
Currently, Louisiana law imposes a peremptive period of one
year on putative fathers seeking to file paternity actions where their
biological child is presumed to be the child of another. 1 However,
the law allows a mother to assert an action contesting a former husband’s paternity and prove her current husband is the father of her
∗ J.D. candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. This case note was prepared under the tutelage of Professor Clare
Ryan.
1. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2020) states the current rule governing a
father’s action to establish paternity and the restricted one-year peremptive period.
Article 3458 explains that “[p]eremption is a period of time fixed by the law for
the existence of a right. Unless timely exercised, the right is extinguished upon
the expiration of the peremptive period.” Typically, putative father refers to the
alleged biological child of a father of a child born out of wedlock. See Father,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). However, in this case note, the term “putative father” refers to a father seeking to establish paternity of a child who is
legally presumed to be the child of another man. A paternity action, commonly
referred to as a paternity suit, is a court proceeding to determine whether a person
is the father of a child. Paternity suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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child within a two-year window. 2 Is that fair? Or is the one-year difference a violation of the putative father’s equal protection rights as
articulated in the federal and state constitutions? Although the putative, and biological, father of a young child argued that the existing
law constituted a violation of his equal protection rights as afforded
in the U.S. Constitution as well as the Louisiana Constitution, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. 3
In August 2012, Danielle Gotreaux Leger gave birth to a child
while married to Michael J. Leger, II. 4 Pursuant to Louisiana Civil
Code article 185, which states the “husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of a child born during the marriage,” the child
was presumed to be the legal offspring of Mr. Leger. However, unbeknownst to Mr. Leger, the child was actually the offspring of his
wife’s paramour—John Fontenot. 5 Though it is not entirely clear
from the record when Mr. Leger became aware of his wife’s infidelity, the couple remained legally married for another four years after
the child’s birth. Mr. Leger did not initiate divorce proceedings until
May of 2016. 6
When Mr. Leger commenced divorce proceedings, Mr. Fontenot
seized the chance to intervene and assert his paternity rights as the
biological father of the minor child born during Leger’s marriage. 7
Mr. Fontenot alleged that DNA testing “established he was the biological father of the minor child” and explained he was “unable to

2. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 (2020).
3. Michael J. Leger, II v. Danielle Gotreaux Leger, 17-270 (La. App. 3 Cir.
12/6/17); 258 So. 3d 624.
4. Id. at 625.
5. Id. at 625.
6. Leger, 258 So. 3d at 625.
7. Id. Mr. Fontenot intervened in the couple’s divorce proceedings as allowed by LA CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1091(3) (2020), which allows a third
person with an interest in a pending legal action to “enforce a right related to or
connected with the object of the pending action against one or more of the parties”
by “opposing both the plaintiff and the defendant.” He intervened during the divorce proceedings in order to assert his legal parentage of the minor child born
during the Leger’s marriage.
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timely file the avowal action pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 198.” 8 Louisiana Civil Code article 198 states as follows:
A man may institute an action to establish his paternity of a
child at any time except as provided in this Article. The action is strictly personal.
If the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the
action shall be instituted within one year from the day of the
birth of the child. Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith
deceived the father of the child regarding his paternity, the
action shall be instituted within one year from the day the
father knew or should have known of his paternity, or within
ten years from the day of the birth of the child, whichever
first occurs.
In all cases, the action shall be instituted no later than one
year from the day of the death of the child.
The time periods in this article are peremptive (emphasis
added).
While intervening, the putative father acknowledged that his attempt to formally assert paternity was past the mandated peremptive
period. 9 However, Mr. Fontenot argued that the bad-faith exception
applied to his circumstances. 10 The paramour explained that he delayed in asserting his parental rights due to “concerns for the safety
of both Ms. Leger and the child” if the child’s true paternity was
revealed during the marriage. 11 He even produced proof of attempts
to covertly seek joint custody by presenting a petition for joint custody and child support filed in a separate trial court proceeding in
February of 2014. 12 Still, the trial court declined to grant Mr. Fontenot an extension on the peremptive period on the basis of bad
faith. 13
In response to the trial court’s denial of his attempts to assert
paternity, Mr. Fontenot filed a “Petition to Declare Louisiana Civil
Code article 198 Unconstitutional” under the same docket as the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Leger, 258 So. 3d at 626.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625.
Id.
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Leger’s divorce proceedings. 14 In that action, Mr. Fontenot “named
Mr. and Ms. Leger, as well as the State of Louisiana, through the
Attorney General, as defendants.” 15 In Mr. Fontenot’s petition, he
referenced the “fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children” and alleged
the one-year peremptive period within Louisiana Civil Code article
198 was “unconstitutionally short and an undue interference with
[his] constitutionally protected rights as a parent of the minor child”
as recognized in Troxel v. Granville. 16
Mr. Fontenot’s petition also highlighted Louisiana Civil Code
article 193 which “allows a mother to institute an action to disavow
a presumed father and establish paternity of the biological father as
long as she institutes the action within two years of the date of the
birth of the child” where the presumed father was the mother’s former husband and the biological father is her current husband. 17 In
his action, Mr. Fontenot lamented that the disparity in the amount of
time afforded to a mother compared to the time afforded a putative
father to bring a disavowal action “violated his rights of equal protection both of Louisiana Constitutional article 1, §3, and U.S. Constitutional Amendment XIV, §1.” 18 He contended there was no reasonable justification for “granting an extra year for the mother of a
child to bring an action to establish the paternity of the biological
father than for the biological father himself.” 19 Consequently,
Mr. Fontenot asked the court to declare Louisiana Civil Code article
198 unconstitutional, and that he be allowed to establish his paternity as well as assert legal custody of the minor child. 20 After this
14. Id. at 626.
15. Id.
16. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49
(2000). See also Leger, 258 So. 3d at 626 (citing id. and Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)).
17. Id. at 627. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 (2020) must be read in light of
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 192 (2020).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 627.
20. Id.
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matter was formally submitted to the trial court, the court denied Mr.
Fontenot’s claim and declared Louisiana Civil Code article 198 constitutional.21 Mr. Fontenot appealed that holding to the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal. 22
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
On appeal, the Third Circuit delivered two pertinent holdings in
this case. First, the court stated that Louisiana Civil Code article 198
“did not violate [the] equal protection clause of [the] state or federal
constitution, even though a mother’s action to contest a former husband’s paternity of her child . . . could be filed within two years of
the child’s birth.” 23 The court reasoned that the difference in time
afforded had a reasonable basis, and explained “a mother contesting
both a former husband’s paternity and attempting to establish her
current husband’s paternity” in accordance with Louisiana Civil
Code article 193 “faced different circumstances and consequences
than a putative father attempting to establish his paternity.” 24 Second, the court also held that “it is possible for parties to be treated
differently without violation of equal protection rights; equal protection of all claimants in all circumstances is not required, as the
law merely requires equal application in similar circumstances.” 25
For that reason, the court held Louisiana Civil Code article 198 does
not violate the equal protection clause of the state or federal constitution. 26
The Third Circuit’s denial of Mr. Fontenot’s rights conforms to
well-established case law regarding the limited rights of putative fathers. In the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., the United States Supreme Court “declined to recognize a biological father’s interest in
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 624.
24. Id.
25. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe”: Disestablishment of Paternity, 48 AKRON L. REV. 263 (2015).
26. Leger, 258 So. 3d at 624.
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maintaining a relationship with his daughter, born as a result of an
adulterous affair with the mother who was then married to another
man.” 27 Mr. Fontenot was in an identical predicament in Leger v.
Leger. In Michael H., the Supreme Court refused to “recognize the
biological father’s Fourth Amendment due process or liberty interest in the maintaining a relationship with his child.” 28
Likewise, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal found no merit in
Mr. Fontenot’s argument that the short peremptive period in Louisiana Civil Code article 198 violated his due process rights. 29 Because
Mr. Fontenot’s due process rights were not violated, the lower
court’s refusal to allow him to establish paternity and denial of custodial rights was constitutional.
III. COMMENTARY
The commentary will explain Mr. Fontenot’s restricted rights to
assert parentage as a putative father under Louisiana Civil Code article 198 in accordance with federal regulations mandating state procedures for establishment and disestablishment of paternity. The
one-year peremptive period in the aforementioned article reflects
federal practices as well. 30 Whether or not the law governing disestablishment of paternity should change in light of modern DNA testing is a related and contested issue shrouded in debate. The policy
motivations for the short temporal limitation on an avowal action
under Louisiana Civil Code article 198 will also be discussed.
As mandated in section 666(a)(5), Title 42, United States Code,
states must create “procedures to establish, rescind, or challenge paternity.” 31 Accordingly, Louisiana Civil Code article 198 provides a
mechanism for the establishment of paternity as required by federal
law. 32 Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Browne-Barbour, supra note 25, at 276.
Id. at 276-277.
Leger, 258 So. 3d at 629.
42 U.S.C.§ 666(a)(5) (2006).
Browne-Barbour, supra note 25, at 291.
Id.

2020]

LEGER V. LEGER

453

“incorporates a one-year limitation of action period for claims based
upon fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or
newly discovered evidence.” 33 Similarly, Louisiana Civil Code article 198 also imposes a one-year limitation on putative fathers bringing an action to disestablish paternity, mirroring the federal regulation.
A. The Role of DNA Testing in Modern Actions for Disestablishment and Establishment of Paternity
Mr. Fontenot’s use of DNA testing to prove his paternity is indicative of a growing concern regarding the role of genetic testing
in cases where paternity is disputed. Generally, “commentators
agree that disestablishment [or establishment of paternity] requires
the balancing of the interests of the affected parties.” 34 Surely, modern DNA testing provides a level of certainty regarding paternity not
previously afforded to presumed fathers such as Mr. Leger and putative fathers such as Mr. Fontenot. However, the role which DNA
testing should play in determining the outcome of legal battles remains uncertain. 35 Because disestablishment of paternity by a nonbiological father “legally severs the parent-child relationship” until
the child is eighteen, at which time the child can choose to have a
relationship with a putative father of their own volition, the role
DNA testing should play in determining who is entitled to custody
and visitation rights remains contested. 36
There are two competing arguments regarding the role DNA
testing should play in establishing or disestablishing parental rights.
Some commentators argue “biological proof of non-paternity should
cause the balancing process to favor the non-biological father’s interests [in disestablishing paternity] over others, including the best

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 292.
Id. at 288-289.
Id.
Id. at 264.
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interests of the child.” 37 Advocates of this rule are primarily concerned with the issue of fairness, and argue DNA testing is valid
grounds for disestablishing paternity obligations.38 It seems unjust
to make a man financially responsible for a child with whom he is
not biologically related. There is also a concern that the presumptive
father is legally bound to the parent-child relationship “based upon
fraud, a material mistake of fact, or other misrepresentation.” 39 This
line of reasoning focuses upon the rights of the established father
and are the primary motivations for granting paternity disestablishment. 40
Instead of mandating legal obligations based solely on biological connections, some argue “courts should place more weight on
maintaining stability in an established parent-child relationship, despite the potential for a loving and supportive relationship with the
biological father.” 41 Here, proponents contend a “child’s right to
have a relationship with his or her paternal family should be comparable to the child’s right to have a relationship with his or her maternal family.” 42 Therefore, a court should focus on the existing ties
between a child and the father seeking to establish or disestablish
paternity as opposed to allowing DNA results to be dispositive of
legal obligations and visitation rights. 43
Moreover, scholars argue mandating a parent-child relationship
is contrary to the best interests of the child. 44 These legal theorists
argue that creating legal rules which establish rights for biological
fathers will be harmful to the child both emotionally and financially. 45 In other words, a “disestablishment of paternity order not
only severs permanently a child’s legally recognized relations with
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Browne-Barbour, at 289.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 288.
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a man previously deemed to be [his or] her father, but also terminates financial support obligations associated with that parent-child
relationship.” 46 These commentators are concerned with the complicated and potentially disastrous nature of reallocating parental
rights after a familial bond, regardless of biological ties, is established. This line of reasoning seeks to preserve an intact family unit
regardless of biological links and appears to be the ideology behind
the Third Circuit’s decision in Leger.
In its analysis, the Leger court emphasized that “the minor child
lived in an ‘intact family structure’ with Mr. Leger as the presumptive father.” 47 The Third Circuit did not consider Mr. Fontenot’s evidence of a biological tie to the young child a persuasive factor when
assessing his claim. In fact, the court only mentioned the DNA evidence proving Mr. Leger was the biological father once in its decision. 48
B. Policy Motivations for the Peremptive Period on Avowal Actions
In Leger, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s reasoning suggests
the peremptive period articulated in Louisiana Civil Code article
198 is necessary to preserve public policy interests in maintaining
intact families. The court explained Mr. Fontenot’s failure to timely
file an avowal action was contrary to the “policy statement contained in Louisiana Civil Code article 198, comment (e),” providing
that the limitation period protects a child “from the upheaval of such
litigation and its consequences in circumstances where the child
may actually live in an existing intact family with his mother and
presumed father or may have become attached over many years to
the man presumed to be his father.” 49 The court also chastised Mr.
Fontenot for failing to properly establish that the “minor child did
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 288.
Leger, 258 So. 3d at 628.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 628.
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not or could not have become attached to Mr. Leger between the
August 2012 birth and the filing of the avowal action in June 2014,”
indicating that a successful avowal action would effectively prove
that there is no attachment between the minor child and presumptive
father. 50 The court’s rationale in denying Mr. Fontenot’s claim
demonstrates the hefty burden required to rebut the presumptive paternity of a husband in accordance with Louisiana Civil Code article
185.
In conclusion, though the one-year peremptive period in Louisiana Civil Code article 198 restricting a putative father’s right to
bring a paternity action appears (at least facially) a violation of his
equal protection rights when compared to the rights of mothers under Louisiana Civil Code article 192, it is not. As the Third Circuit
noted, a putative father under Louisiana Civil Code article 198 is not
similarly situated to a mother seeking to contest a former husband’s
paternity and prove her current husband is the father of her child
pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code articles 192 and 193. 51 To state the
matter plainly, Mrs. Leger’s maternity rights regarding the young
child were never challenged, which contrasts greatly with Mr. Fontenot’s struggle to assert paternity rights. Mr. Fontenot, in contrast
to a mother contesting paternity under Louisiana Civil Code articles
192 and 193, was not married to the child’s biological parent and
seeking to rebut the legal presumption of parentage of a former
spouse. In order for Louisiana Civil Code article 198 to be found
unconstitutional, a civil code article extending a longer peremptive
period for putative mothers would need to exist. 52
In accordance with state and federal law, the Third Circuit’s reasoning was sound in the case at issue. In light of modern familial
structures and the policy motivations protecting intact family units,
50. Id. at 629.
51. Id. at 628.
52. Black’s Law dictionary does not include the term “putative mother,”
which indeed sounds purely hypothetical. However, in this context, the phrase
refers to a mother seeking to assert parental rights where her child is presumed to
be the child of another woman.
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the Third Circuit’s decision to avoid allocating parental rights based
solely on DNA evidence was wise and well poised. Leger v. Leger,
in a manner analogous to Michael H. v. Herald G., restricts a putative father’s rights and illustrates the “remaining power of the parental presumption” of parentage within marriage as well as the
“stigma of sexual conduct outside the marital relationship.” 53 This
case serves as a clear warning to those with married lovers; file an
avowal action within the one-year peremptive period stipulated in
Louisiana Civil Code article 198 or forfeit custodial rights to any
offspring of that relationship.

53. Browne-Barbour, supra note 25, at 277.

